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DEVELOPMENT

The Antarctica Mineral Resources
Convention: Developments from the October
1986 Tokyo Meeting of the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties
INTRODUCTION

Antarctica, geographically isolated at the southern pole, is a continent cloaked in uniqueness, both physically and legally. Due to the continuing depletion of world mineral resources, interest in Antarctica as a
potential resource production area has increased. Currently, the thirtytwo Antarctica Treaty members are developing a legal order to control
future resource exploration in this region. Antarctica Treaty members are
intent on keeping the new regime within the existing Antarctica Treaty
system. Thus far, drafts for the regime have been introduced as the
"Chairman's Informal Personal Reports" in order to assist parties in establishing the final convention.
This development will outline the proposed legal regime for Antarctica and briefly discuss this region's resource potential. The main part of
this article will analyze the relevant language of the latest draft proposal
in order to understand how the proposed convention will operate. Finally,
important issues that should be considered in subsequent drafts will be
identified. It is important to understand the mechanics of the Convention
since it will be the future governing body authorizing and monitoring all
resource activities in Antarctica.
I.

ANTARCTIC RESOURCES

Geological investigations comprise much of the scientific work done
in Antarctica. These studies have thus far been conducted under the
guise of "pure" scientific investigation with no proprietary rights to the
gathered information by private resource companies. Geologists have indicated that Antarctica may contain substantial offshore petroleum resources and onshore mineral deposits.'

1. Geophysical surveys in West Antarctica suggest the presence of several kilometer
thick sedimentary units beneath the ice sheets and continental shelves. A Deep Sea Drilling
Project drill hole in the Ross Sea in 1973 detected small amounts of methane and ethane.
An area of additional interest for offshore oil potential is the Weddell Sea See generally,
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No deposits have been discovered thus far, but occurrences of base
metals, chromium, cobalt, uranium, gold, and platinum have been found
throughout much of Antarctica.' Several logistical problems are anticipated for mineral ventures in Antarctica: 1) only two percent of the continent is not covered by ice and the portion that is covered may be buried
by up to two kilometers of ice; 2) harsh weather conditions persist over
the entire continent; 3) icebergs and their scouring effects would severely
hinder offshore oil exploration, drilling, and production; and 4) the anticipated high cost of operation and the current state of technology places
Antarctic resources, as a viable mineral source, far into the future.
Nevertheless, efforts to develop an Antarctic regime continue in the
anticipation that resources will be produced in the near future. The regime will provide an administrative body to oversee the regulation and
operation of resource activities.
II.

THE ANTARCTIC REGIME

Antarctica' is currently under the administration of the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs).4 The treaty evolved from the International Geophysical Year (1959) and essentially established Antarctica
as a scientific laboratory. Under the terms of the Treaty, all members of
the United Nations may accede to it's provisions.5 Once a state has acceded to the treaty, it may reach consultative status by conducting substantial scientific research in Antarctica. 6 Consultative parties (ATCPs)
are the only states entitled to make policy decisions for Antarctica. There
are currently eighteen ATCPs and fourteen non-consultative parties
(NCP).7 Seven countries have also claimed territorial sovereignty over
Mineral Resources of Antarctica, 705 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR (1974); Petroleum
and Mineral Resources of Antarctica, 909 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR (J.Brehendt
ed. 1983).
2. Mineral potential of onland areas is based upon geologic plate reconstruction models.
The supercontinent of Gondwanaland, composed of South America, Southern Africa, Antarctica, and Australia broke up approximately 180 million years ago. Similar geologic structures in South America, South Africa, and Australia are projected into Antarctica. Included
in these structures are rocks containing base metals, precious metals, and diamonds. Coal is
also a potential resources. Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Antarctica, 909 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 29 (J. Brehendt ed. 1983).
3. See generally, F. AUBURN, ANTARCTICA LAW AND POLITICS (1982); P. QUIGG, A POLE
APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA (1983).

4. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
5. Id. art. XIII, para. 1.
6. Id. art. IX, para. 1-2.
7. Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) include:
Claimants
Argentina
Australia
Chile
France
New Zealand

Non-Claimants
Belgium
Brazil
W. Germany
India
Japan

South Africa
USA
Uruguay
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portions of Antarctica.8 Article IV of the Treaty holds these claims in
abeyance, neither recognizing nor condemning the claims.
The Treaty applies to the lands, waters and ice shelves south of 60
degrees South Latitude9 and states that such lands shall be used for
peaceful purposes only."0 Military operations are expressly forbidden, 1 as
are nuclear explosions and the disposal of nuclear waste. 2 ATCPs are
also allowed inspection rights to all of Antarctica." Besides demilitarization and scientific cooperation, a third goal of the ATCPs is to protect the
environment and ecosystem of Antarctica. 4 No explicit language expresses this goal, however, subsequent agreements in the Treaty system
seek to protect the Antarctic environment. 5 In 1964, the ATCPs unanimously accepted the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic
Flora and Fauna.' Marine life is protected through the Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 17 and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.'"
There has always been an interest in the mineral potential of Antarctica, but there is no provision in the Treaty for mineral management, exploration or exploitation. The following factors explain the more recent
interest in mineral resources: 9 1) the new interest in the international

Norway
United Kingdom

China
Poland

Antarctic Treaty Non-Consultative Parties (NCPs)
Bulgaria
E. Germany
Italy
Cuba
Hungary
Romania
Netherlands
Spain
Czechoslovakia
Peru
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Papua
New Guinea
8. Id.; These claims are based on such traditional theories as 1) the sector principle, 2)
propinquity, 3) uti possidetis, and 4) effective occupation. See generally, Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal With an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 249 (1986); Parriott, TerritorialClaims in Antarctica: Will the United States be Left
Out in the Cold?, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 67 (1986).
9. See supra note 4, art. VI.
10. Id., art. I, para. 1.
11. Id., art. 1, para. 1-2.
12. Id., art. V, para. 1.
13. Id., art. VII, para. 3.
14. Barcelo, The InternationalLegal Regime of Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155,
157 (1986).
15. Joyner, Protection of the Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259, 265 (1986).
16. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, June 2-13,
1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, 998, T.I.A.S.No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 7692
(1973).
17.Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441,
T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978).
18. Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 80 Stat. 271,
T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982).
19. Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 163, 164 (1986).
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law of common resources, such as the ocean floor 2" and space;21 2) the
global concern for secure petroleum supplies following the 1973 oil shock;
and 3) the perception of Antarctica as a strategic region in the event of
global armed conflict. The Prime Minister of Malaysia urged the United
Nations to focus its attention on Antarctica as another area belonging to
the international community." Issues discussed have included territorial
claims of sovereignty, adequacy of the Treaty regime, and a proposed international management of Antarctica.2" Currently, the central issue
before the General Assembly is whether a mineral regime is lawful under
international law. 4 The U.N interest in the Antarctica question has
spurred the ATCPs to intensify efforts to conclude a mineral regime
within the Treaty structure.
III.

MINERAL REGIME

Work on a mineral regime for Antarctica began in 1973 with the
Nansen Foundation.2 5 Since then, numerous meetings between the
ATCPs have taken place. In July 1983, the chairman of the meeting in
Bonn, Christopher Beeby of New Zealand, introduced an "informal personal proposal" which became known as the "Beeby Draft." In the May
1984 Tokyo Minerals Meeting, a revised version, "Beeby II," was released. The latest version, "Beeby III", was submitted to the October
1986 meeting of Consultative Parties in Tokyo.2 7 These drafts are important because they serve as a working paper that guides the "Contact
Groups" and discussion groups toward a final statement.
It is the ATCPs desire to remain involved in any future mineral
scheme and thus, they argue that any regime should be rooted in the
Antarctic Treaty system.28 Two opposing views regarding the legitimacy
of a proposed regime are that it would violate the Treaty because such
activities are not "pure" science, or that a regime is compatible with the

20. United States Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
21. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664, reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 1434
(1979)(entered into force July 11, 1984)(hereinafter cited as Moon Treaty); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347,
610 U.N.T.S. 205.
22. Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
275 (1986).
23. Id. at 279.
24. Supra note 19, at 170.
25. Supra note 19, at 165.
26. The Antarctic Mineral Resources Regime: Beeby Draft II, reprinted in Greenpeace
Int'l., The Future of the Antarctic: Background for a Third U.N. Debate (Appendix 9)
(Nov. 25, 1985).
27. Antarctic Mineral Resources Convention: Beeby III, Sept. 19, 1986 (on file at the
offices of the Denver Journal of InternationalLaw and Policy).
28. Supra note 19, at 165.
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treaty based on the "peaceful purpose" clause.2"
In past regime proposals, two issues were of great concern; those
dealing with territorial claims and the environment. Territorial claims
should neither be condemned nor confirmed in the regime, in accordance
with Article IV of the Treaty, nor should the issuance of prospecting
rights give a state the foundation for future territorial claims. Additionally, environment safeguards should be established in the spirit of the
Treaty.
Two approaches have been suggested in establishing a mineral regime.30 The ATCPs argue that the regime should be a part of the
Antarctic Treaty and any decision-making should remain with the
ATCPs. The other view, advocated by less developed countries (LDCs),
follows the "common heritage of mankind"3 doctrine adopted by the
Law of the Sea Convention,32 whereby all activities are guaranteed to be
for the benefit of all mankind. The common heritage principle is relatively new, not being expressed in 1959 at the time of the Antarctic
Treaty, but later embodied in the Law of the Sea and the Moon Treaty. 3s
Thus far, the members to the Antarctic Treaty have been the principle actors in forming a mineral regime, as witnessed by the Beeby drafts.
All versions call for an institutional body to oversee mineral activities.
There are two models for an institutional structure retaining jurisdiction:
1) all parties to the regime will be represented, or 2) the ."closed shop"
approach.3 4 Beeby II followed the former model affording Commission
status to "each Party to the regime which participated in the meeting at
which the regime was adopted."3 " However, the current draft has moved
more towards the closed shop model. Beeby III now stipulates that Commission membership is extended to those parties that are ATCPs or become ATCPs. s6

29. Id. at 166.
30. See supra note 19, at 169.
31. For an excellent discussion of the Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine written
by Professor Christopher Joyner, see Comment, Legal Implications of the Concept of the
Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986).
32. See supra note 20.
33. See supra note 21. The primary theme is that resources found in res communis
omnium should be used in such a way as to benefit all mankind. This principle would preclude a state from asserting territorial claims to those areas in which mineral activities are
conducted. Additionally, due regard for the environment can be inferred. Another area of
contention is the allocation of captured rents from mineral exploitation. The common heritage principle would allocate a portion of the revenues for the benefit of the international
community.
34. Id. at 182.
35. See supra note 26, art. X.
36. See supra note 27, art. 19.
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THE BEEBY III DRAFT

Beeby III is now regarded as a "convention," 3 becoming part of the
Antarctic Treaty family. Beeby III also recognizes "the special responsibility" of the ATCPs to "ensure that any activities in Antarctica are consistent with the Treaty"3 8 The convention should be consistent with Article IV of the Treaty concerning claimed territorial rights. Protection of
the environment should be a "basic consideration" in decisions on possible mineral activities, and regulation of resources is to be in "the interests
of the international community as a whole." Concerning who may explore
for minerals in Antarctica, the preamble states: "[Plarticipation in
Antarctic mineral resources should be open to all states which have an
interest in such activities and subscribe to a regime governing them and
that the special situation of developing countries party to the regime
should be taken into account."39
Mineral resource activities are defined as those associated with prospecting, exploration, or development of mineral resources, exclusive of
pure scientific work. Prospecting is the broad reconnaissance scale geological, geochemical, and geophysical investigations. Exploration is the identification, evaluation, and delineation of prospect targets. Development
means those activities associated with exploitation of a delineated

deposit.40
A central theme is that the Convention be an integral part of the
Antarctic Treaty system. Its objective is the establishment of means for:
1) assessing environmental impact; 2) determining whether activities are
acceptable; 3) governing the conduct of activities; and 4) ensuring strict
conformance to the Convention."' In addition, the Parties acknowledge
the need to: 1) protect the environment; 2) respect scientific and aesthetic
values; 3) ensure safe operations; 4) follow "orderly mining practices and
act in an economically rational manner;" 5) promote fair opportunities for
all parties; and 6) "take into account" the interests of the international
community as a whole.42 Only those activities
conducted within the Con43
vention will be allowed in Antarctica.

No decision will be made without assessing the impact to the environment, including harm to 1) the air, water, and atmospheric quality; 2)
terrestrial and marine life; and 3) the scientific, historic, or aesthetic significance. 44 No activity will take place unless the technology exists to
monitor key environmental parameters and to effectively respond to acci-

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id., preamble.
Id.
Id.

Id., art. 1.
Id., art. 2, para. 1.
Id., art. 2, para. 3.
Id., art. 3.
Id., art. 4, para. 2.
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dents. Environmental judgments are to consider the cumulative effects of
mineral activity, alone or in combination with other legitimate
activities."'
The Convention applies to resource activities on the continent and
areas south of sixty degrees south latitude including ice shelves, continental shelves, or other offshore areas not inclusive of the deep sea bed."'
Mineral activities may be conducted by a Party to the Convention,
agency of a Party, natural person, juridical person, or joint venture of the
foregoing."7 Each operator will have a link with a Party, either through
nationality or the location of the central management and control in the
territory of a Party."'
The Convention calls for international participation by ATCPs and
other LDC Parties. Anyone can participate as long as they are a party to
the Convention. The Commission is responsible for detecting any activities being conducted by non-parties. Article IV of the Treaty is not affected. Therefore, mineral activities will not constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim of territorial sovereignty.' 9 Activities
will be consistent with the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora,' 0 Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources,"' and the Convention For the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 2 Stations, installations, and equipment relating
to mineral activities will also be subject to inspection rights under the
Treaty. 3 Mineral activities will be prohibited in Specially Protected Areas or in a Site of Special Scientific Interest."'
Internal institutional bodies are established to carry out the provisions of the Convention. Activities of the various institutions will be financed through fees on permits and levies on operators."' The central institutional body will be the Antarctic Minerals Resources Commission
(Commission)."' Membership is extended to each Party which was an
ATCP at the adoption of the Convention, any other Party that reaches
ATCP status, or any Party which has applied for an exploration permit
that has an approved management scheme.' Each member will be represented by one representative. Non-Commission members and relevant international organizations may have observer status in the Commission.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
See
See
See
See
See
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

art. 4, para. 5.
art. 5.
art. 6, para. 1.
art. 6, para. 2.
art. 7; art. 9, para. 2, art. II.
supra note 16.
supra note 18.
supra note 17.
supra note 13.
supra note 27, art. 14.
art. 34.
art. 19, para. 1.
art. 19, para. 2.
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Functions of the Commission are to: 1) determine whether to identify
an area for exploration and development; 2) facilitate information exchange for environmental assessment; 3) designate excluded areas; 4)
adopt safe and effective measures for prospecting, exploration, development, and environmental protection; 5) adopt administrative measures;
and 6) review operations with a view to safeguarding the "environment in
the interests of all mankind."58 In exercising its functions, the Commission will take "account" of advice from the Advisory Committee. Decisions on "matters of substance" will be made by a two-thirds majority of
present, voting members. Other decisions will be by simple majority. 59
Parties also agree to maintain a Scientific, Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee). Membership is open
to any Party to the Convention and observer status will be granted to any
Party to the Antarctic Treaty. Additionally, relevant international organizations, including non-governmental, will also be afforded observer status. 60 The Advisory Committee is free to seek the advice of other scientists and experts. It will also receive the views of organizations interested
in the considered issues.
The Advisory Committee's function is to advise the Commission and
Regulatory Committees by providing a forum for information collection,
exchange, and evaluation. As such, it is to recommend research projects,
advise Parties on available information and training programs and make
recommendations for prohibited areas. Further, it can provide the Commission with advice on areas for exploration, development, and boundary
modifications, recommend environmental protection measures and effective exploration and development techniques, and monitor mineral
activities. 6
The parties also agree to establish a Special Meeting of States Parties (Special Meeting) in relation to the identification of areas for exploration and development.6 2 Membership is open to all Parties to the Convention. Observer status is afforded to any Antarctic Treaty party and
international organization entitled to observer status for Commission and
63
Advisory Committee meetings.
There will be a separate Regulatory Committee for each area the
Commission identifies for mineral activity. Membership will consist of the
member of the commission (if any) asserting territorial sovereignty over
the identified area, the two members of the Commission which maintained the largest presence when the Antarctic Treaty came into force,
and additional members of the Commission including four members asserting territorial claims in Antarctica and four other members not assert-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
Id., art.

22,
23.
24,
26.
28,
28,

para. 1.
para. 2-3.
para. 1.
para. 2-3.
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ing territorial claims. In selecting members, the Chairman of the Commission will ensure equitable representation of LDC members.6" If the Party
applying for an exploration permit is not a member of the Regulatory
Committee, that Party will become a member for consideration of that
application.65 Any Party to the Convention may attend a Regulatory
Committee meeting as an observer.
Functions of each Regulatory Committee will be to identify specific
blocks, consider applications for exploration permits, draft and approve
management schemes, and monitor, review, and revise activities in accordance with management schemes.66
Prospecting in Antarctica requires no specific authorization, nor will
it confer any right or title to resources to the operator. Prospecting need
only comply with the objectives and principles of the Convention.67 Nine
months before an operator begins prospecting, the Sponsoring State must
notify the Commission and specify the general area of prospecting,and
the mineral resources sought. Included in the notice should be the methods, programs, and support facilities to be used, possible environmental
impact, and the duration of prospecting. The link between the operator
and the Sponsoring State must also be specified."
Any Party may request the Commission to identify an area for possible exploration and development. The notification must include a precise
location of the area with a description of the physical and environmental
conditions, and specification of the resource sought. A description of
methods to be employed, and an assessment of potential environmental
impacts of exploration and development must also be stated."
After receipt of the request notification by the Commission, the Advisory Committee will convey its view to the Commission. The Special
Meeting then considers whether a determination by the Commission to
identify an area is in accordance with the Convention.7 0 The Commission,
"taking full account" of the views of the Advisory Committee and Special
Meeting, then determines whether such an identification would be consistent with the Convention indicating which part of the area is covered,
what resource is concerned, and the participation of Parties in the venture." If there is a consensus of members, the Commission will identify
the area as consistent with the Convention.
After a positive determination, a Regulatory Committee will convene
to identify specific blocks and establish appropriate application fees. ' Af-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

29,
29,
31.
35,
35,
37.
38.
39,
41.

para. 2.
para. 5.
para. 1-3.
para. 6.

para. 1.
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ter the Regulatory Committee has acted, any Party may enter an exploration permit application, either on its behalf or for a sponsored operator.
This application will: 1) identify the resource; 2) detail methods, equipment, and support facilities; 3) assess environmental impacts including
measures to be used in event of an accident; 4) describe safety measures;
and 5) specify the duration of the permit. In the event an operator other
than a Party is involved, the application will describe the operator includ73
ing its financial resources and technical expertise.
If the Regulatory Committee is not satisfied with the link between an
operator and Sponsoring Party, the application is canceled.7 4 In the event
of multiple applications for the same block, the Parties will be directed
by the Regulatory Committee to resolve the competition amongst themselves. Failing that, the Regulatory Committee will resolve the issue giving priority to the application with the broadest participation amongst
the Parties, with an emphasis given to LDCs" The application is then
referred to the Advisory Committee which will identify environmental
risks and concerns. If the Advisory Committee finds an "unacceptable
risk," the Regulatory Committee may either reject the application or refer
it to the Commission, which can authorize the Regulatory Committee to
proceed with the application. 7 If the Advisory Committee finds no unacceptable risks, the Regulatory Committee proceeds with the preparation
of a management scheme. A management scheme prescribes terms and
conditions relating to: 1) the law applicable to the operator; 2) inspection
and enforcement of the scheme, 3) financial obligations, including levies,
taxes, and royalties.; 4) technical and safety specifications; 5) depletion
policy; 6) exploration time limits and diligence requirements; 7) accident
contingency plans; 8) liability, bonding, and insurance; and 9) decommissioning requirements.77 A simple majority of the Regulatory Committee is
needed to approve the draft management scheme whereby the scheme is
7
authorized and a permit is issued. s
An operator with a valid exploration permit has the exclusive right to
explore and develop (subject to Articles 50 and 51) mineral resources in
the permitted block.79 These activities will be monitored by the Advisory
Committee and Regulatory Committee for compliance with the management scheme."0
Following successful exploration activities, a Sponsoring State may
submit an application for a development permit. The application will

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

art.
art.
art.
art.
art,
art,
art,
Id., art,

42.
43, para. 2.
43, para. 3.
43, para. 8.
45.
46.
48.
49.
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contain updated information and proposed modifications to the scheme."'
The Advisory Committee reviews the application to determine whether
there are any significant modifications or new environmental considerations. A report is submitted to the Regulatory Committee to consider for
any new guidelines. It is then up to the Regulatory Committee to authorize the development permit.2

V.

EVALUATION OF THE DRAFT

In its present form, the Convention rejects the proposal of placing
Antarctic resources under the Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine.
Language alluding to the "interests of the international community as a
whole 83 and safeguarding the environment "in the interests of all mankind" 8 may sound suspiciously like that of the common heritage doctrine, but it only echoes language used in the Antarctic Treaty, which
does not support the common heritage concept.8 5 Mineral activities would
be conducted within the Treaty family. Only members of the "Club" will
be allowed to explore for resources.
The current draft seeks to reach a more equitable position for the
various conflicting interests. Claimant states with territorial claims are
not to be recognized nor rejected, although the language establishing Regulatory Committees explicitly recognized that states do indeed have
claims. Because these states claim territorial sovereignty over sections of
Antarctica, they assert that they should have a central role in revenue
sharing and inspection control, and a veto over activities in "their" areas.
These are issues the draft rejects. The only recognition a claimant state is
afforded is a position on the Regulatory Committee concerning activities
in "their" area.
Less developed countries have lobbied for a larger presence in Antarctica. Whether it is the lure of anticipated shared revenue or just political maneuvering that has brought about this attention, the fact remains
that LDCs want an insured involvement in any regime established for
Antarctic resources. Other points advocated by LDCs are mandatory joint
ventures and a sharing of technology, positions the ATCPs are against.
Environmental protection is a basic concern in any mineral activity
due to the unique nature of the Antarctic environment. Environmental
interest groups have advocated mandatory impact assessments on all
phases of activity, stronger inspection provisions, and an internal policing
body. No institutional body is established by Beeby III, however, con-

81. Id., art, 50.
82. Id., art, 51.
83. See supra note 37.
84. See supra note 58.
85. The language is quite similar to that used in the preamble to the Treaty where "it
is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes."
86. For a discussion concerning a proposed Antarctic Environmental Protection
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sideration of the environment is stated in the objectives and principles of
the Convention, and provided for at the prospecting, area identification,
exploration application, and permitting stages. Other unresolved issues
involve deciding which Party is to be responsible for environmental protection compliance. Mining states would favor the Sponsoring State, but
claimant states also want to exercise their alleged jurisdiction.
The Regulatory Committees retain the most control over all aspects
of mineral activities. Regulatory Committees approve the management
schemes and issue the exploration and development permits. The Commission wouid not have the power to cancel management schemes at either the exploration or development stages. The only place the Commission has real power is in identifying an area. A consensus is needed to
approve identification. States favoring mining would rather have approval
by a "majority", but states favoring strict control prefer "consensus."
NCP are effectively removed from decision-making at this stage and any
subsequent stage. The Special Meeting of States Parties, which largely
accommodates NCP, is only a "strong" advisor to the Commission, with
no real power. Advisory Committees are also relegated to an advisory position only, with no real power. However, this body may be prone to political influences as it is the only place that NCP have a role, or an opportunity for input in exploration and development activities.
The composition of Regulatory Committees has posed national
problems. The United States and U.S.S.R. are guaranteed seats on every
Regulatory Committee since they are the two countries having the largest
position in Antarctica at the signing of the Treaty. LDCs wanted a guaranteed seat on each Committee, but now they are considered for a seat as
non-claimants. Additionally, criticism of Regulatory Committees also centers on the fact that each committee oversees only one area, leading to
different guidelines and a breakdown in uniformity.
The mechanism for resolving multiple exploration permit applications has been changed. Beeby III took the position that in the case of
competing bids, first in time would have priority. LDCs wanted more involvement, and hence, the current version whereby broad international
participation and LDC involvement would give priority. Other states had
advocated an approach that would have taken recognition of financial
soundness, technological expertise, and environmental protection
measures.
The only opportunity for institutions other than the Regulatory
Committees to review or even override the Regulatory Committee is at
the exploration application stage. This check only applies to the permit
application; no such check exists on management schemes. In Beeby III,
it is the sole responsibility of the Regulatory Committee. Management
schemes are not required to go to the Advisory Committee for comment.
In the permitting stage, once an operator obtains an exploration permit,

Agency, see, Joyner, supra note 15, at 270.
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it is virtually assured the right to proceed to development. Development
permitting is also the sole responsibility of the Regulatory Committee
with no Commission involvement.
As yet, no proposals have been introduced for dispute settlement.
Neither is there specific language concerning the responsibility and liability of parties engaged in mineral activities. It is expected that these issues
will be addressed in the next draft.
The ATCPs have gone far to ensure that mineral activities in Antarctica will be conducted with due regard for the environment and the established legal order. It is hoped that the final version will further delineate
these principles and provide a manageable system for all future mineral
activities Maybe even more importantly, the formulation of the Convention will test the cohesiveness of the Treaty System, which will ultimately
determine the future stability of the Antarctic Regime.
E. Paul Newman

